Further, the authors show that the amount of unsecured debt is strongly and positively correlated with GDP across all samples (0.70 to 0.75 correlation), while secured debt is only weakly correlated with GDP and its relationship is 
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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis | research.stlouisfed.org negative in two of the three samples: the full sample and the sample excluding the largest 1 percent of firms (-0.15 to 0.15 correlation). Moreover, unsecured debt tends to lead GDP by one year-suggesting that it might drive GDPwhereas secured debt tends to lag GDP in the sample that excludes the top 5 percent of firms (Figure 2) . Finally, the authors conclude that unsecured debt usefully forecasts GDP, conditioned on the history of GDP, while secured debt is not helpful in predicting GDP.
The authors also used data from the flow of funds account to measure secured debt and unsecured debt in the U.S. economy and found similar results. The authors document that unsecured debt is a key contributor to fluc tuations in GDP at least after 1980, while secured debt is not strongly correlated with and does not drive movements in GDP. This finding is important because conventional macrofinance theories assume the value of collateralwhich allows firms to issue secured debt-is the important factor that allows firms to borrow. The data show, however, that unsecured debt is the important driver of economic activity, so the value of collateral is probably not very important. So, at the firm level, unsecured debt is more important than secured debt in understanding the busi ness cycle. Unsecured debt better predicts economic activity than secured debt. on their theoretical model shows that these selffulfilling shocks to firm confidence in future credit market condi tions can account for about 50 percent of aggregate fluc tuations in GDP. n NOTE 1 Unsecured debt here is measured as the difference between total debt and secured debt (mortgages etc.), so a decline in the share of unsecured debt implies a rise in mortgage or other collateralized debt. Since large firms can skew the results, Figure 1 compares the results for the samples excluding the largest 1 percent and 5 percent of firms by asset size. While removing the largest firms lowers the average share of unsecured debt, the time variation of debt does not vary significantly. To explain these empirical findings, the authors build a theoretical business cycle model. Specifically, they argue that because a firm's reputation in the market plays a criti cal role in its ability to issue debt in the unsecured debt market and because reputation is a selffulfilling behavior (in the sense that one's desired future selfimage influences current behavior), a firm's belief about future credit market conditions (such as the likelihood of default in the market) is important in shaping its present behavior in the credit market. As a result, the more confident firms are about future credit market conditions, the less likely they will choose to default and thus the more likely they will be able to borrow to finance investment, which in turn will strengthen credit market conditions in the future. Thus, firms' confidence in the credit market will affect the size of the unsecured debt market, which in turn influences aggregate GDP. The authors' calibration exercise based 
